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The Kongka Pass or Kongka La () is a low mountain pass on the Line of Actual Control between India and China in eastern Ladakh. It lies on a spur of the Karakoram range that intrudes into the Chang Chenmo Valley adjacent to the disputed Aksai Chin region. China claimed the location as its border in a 1956 map, and attacked an Indian patrol party in 1959 killing ten policemen and apprehending ten others. Known as the Kongka Pass incident, the event was a milestone in the escalation of the border dispute between the two countries.
A Tibetan name for the pass is now in circulation, as "Kongka La" (), which can be interpreted as a "wintertime pass".
To all appearances, the Kongka Pass was an unimportant saddle point, while the normal travel route followed the course of the Changchenmo river. (Maps 2 and 3) However, it was also possible to travel east by ascending the pass, especially in wintertime when the river area might be icy. Arthur Douglas Carey and Andrew Delgleish used the pass in 1885 in travelling from Ladakh to Keriya Town.
Since 1959, the Kongka Pass formed part of the dividing line between India and China, China having extended its claims till this point. (Map 4) Kongka Pass is also on the dividing line between China's Xinjiang and Tibet autonomous regions. The Chang Chenmo Valley to the east of here is part of Tibet; the Aksai Chin region to the north is part of Xinjiang. China has a large military base at the bottom of the Kyapsang river valley, called the Kongka Shankou base near a saddle point called Mobdo La. (Map 3)
In the Indian-controlled territory immediately to the west of Kongka Pass lie the notable Hot Springs (at a location called Kyam). This location is roughly the point where the bend in the Changchenmo river ends, and river flows due west. To the northwest of here extends the Kugrang river valley, with the campsite of Gogra at short distance above. At Gogra, the Changlung river flows down and joins the Kugrang river.
To the south of the Kongka Pass, three tributaries, all called " Silung", flow down from the Changchenmo Range to join Changchenmo. From the west to east, they are referred to as Silung Yokma, Silung Barma and Silung Kongma (the lower, middle and upper Silungs). Further east is another tributary called Stathrao. On a tributary of Silung Kongma called Nyingri lies the route to the Pangong Lake region, via Kyungang La, which was once regarded as the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet. (Map 3) At present, Silung Yokma lies in the Indian-controlled territory and the rest lie in Chinese-controlled territory. (for geographical details only; Kyungang La is spelt "Kieun-la").
In 1952, Indian patrol teams had reached till Lanak La without encountering any Chinese presence. When enquired in 1954 and again in 1956 about demarcating boundaries in the sector, Zhou Enlai replied that the PRC government was still printing Kuomintang maps and had not had the time to prepare their own maps. While maintaining this position, the Chinese would lay the Sianking–Tibet road (now G219) through Aksai Chin to Indian objections and even imprison a two-men strong patrol party.
In 1956, a map was published that marked Kongka Pass as the boundary in the Chang Chenmo Valley; three years hence, Zhou would note this particular map to be an accurate representation of Chinese position and claim Kongka Pass to be the "traditional customary boundary" of China.Chou Enlai, The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, Foreign Language Press, Peking, November 1962. "In October 1959 Indian armed forces crossed the traditional customary boundary line in the western sector and provoked a sanguinary border clash of an even graver nature at Kongka Pass." (emphasis added) Leo E. Rose and Wim van Eekelen find such claims to be inconsistent with the available evidence.: "Confusion as to the extent of the Chang Chenmo valley between the Lanak and Kongka passes continued to be a feature of Chinese cartography even after the Communists came to power.... the flexibility shown by official Chinese cartographers here and on other sections of the border makes mockery of China's oft-repeated claim that its concept of the border has a solid basis in history."
The same evening, Singh dispatched a 10-men-strong party to investigate the disappearance, who returned late night and reported extensive hoof-marks in the region suggesting the presence of Chinese cavalry. On the morning of 21 October, a forward search party of 20 men set out on ponies under Singh; the rest was ordered to follow on foot under another commander called Tyagi. Singh chose to follow the hoof-marks near Kongka Pass and lost contact with Tyagi's men. Singh encountered Chinese soldiers on top of a hill, who belonged to the 6th Cavalry Regiment and were well-entrenched in their position. A firefight ensued after negotiations failed. Nine Indian policemen were killed during the engagement, one died later of his injuries, and seven were taken prisoner. One Chinese soldier of the rank of "Deputy Squadron Leader" was killed too.
After release, Karam Singh reported that the detained personnel were put in a storage pit for four days under severe climatic conditions without water, refused medical attention, interrogated in 12 hour stretches for further several days, induced to sign false confessions about them being responsible for the episode, window-dressed for photographs, and finally returned to India on 14 November.: 'Singh's testimony provides a good picture of Chinese interrogating technique: "This interrogation lasted from 4:00 A.M. to about 4:00 P.M. By this time I was almost frozen and mentally and physically exhausted because of cold, persistent interrogation, intimidation, threats, angry shoutings and lack of sleep. In this condition I was compelled to sign the statement recorded by the Chinese. At the end of this interrogation the Chinese then brought all the other captured personnel before me and read out the statement and several photographs were taken."... The incident was staged according to the Chinese version of events while photographs were taken which could be used as evidence in support of the Chinese allegations that the Indian patrol had provoked the incident.' The bodies of the dead soldiers were returned a day earlier at the new border of Kongka Pass and China rejected payment of any compensation. Scholar John Rowland states that, through these means, China obtained the "evidence" it needed to claim that it was India that broke the Panchsheel (peace agreement between the two countries) unprovoked. China however rejected Singh's testimony and charged Indian Government of promoting Sinophobic sentiments.
Indian Army castigated the Intelligence Bureau for causing mindless provocations at the frontiers without bringing them in confidence and from 1 November, took charge of manning all border-posts in the sector. Throughout the time of the detention, China claimed that Kongka Pass was patrolled by their troops ever since liberation of Tibet and that the episode happened only due to unprovoked aggression by Indian side; threats were made to infiltrate NEFA if Indian patrols were to disregard Chinese claims in the Ladakh sector. Public protests called for resignation of defence minister Krishna Menon and abandonment of non-alignment as a strategic policy. Indian media described the event as a "brutal massacre of an Indian police party" with The Indian Express carrying an editorial about how Nehru had ignored the "menace of Han expansionism and Communist Imperialism." The incident contributed to the heightening of tensions that led to the Sino-Indian War in 1962.
The Chinese border outpost is located a few kilometers to the east at an elevation of .
Called Kongka Shankou base, it is located at the junction of the Kyapsang and Chang-Chenmo rivers. The outpost is linked to the China National Highway 219 (G219) via two highways.
Geography
The Chang Chenmo Valley lies in a depression between the Karakoram Range in the north and the Changchenmo Range in the south.
Immediately to the north of the Chang Chenmo Valley, the Karakoram Range splits into multiple branches, with one of the branches (called "Karakoram-I" by some authors) forming a dividing ridge between the Kugrang River in the west and the Changlung River and Kyapsang rivers in the east. A spur of this branch extends into the Chang Chenmo Valley for some distance, forcing the Changchenmo river to bend around it. On this spur lies the low pass of Kongka Pass, essentially forming a part of the general depression that is the Chang Chenmo valley.
Sino-Indian border dispute
Colonial-era British sources state that the traditional boundary between Ladakh and Tibet, accepted by both sides, was at Lanak La, where the Changchenmo River originates.Bower, Hamilton, Diary of A Journey across Tibet, London, 1894Rawling, C. G., The Great Plateau Being An Account of Exploration in Central Tibet, 1903, And of the Gartok Expedition 1904–1905, p 38, London, 1905 Chinese maps had recognised Lanak La as the boundary at least till 1951.: p. 591: "The Atlas of China ( Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo hsin ti-t’u, published in 1951) is one of the earliest maps published by the PRC, after the Communist Party came to power. The agency accrediting the maps was the Zhongguo Tushu Faxing Gongsi (a government-approved office similar to the Ministry of Internal Affairs/Security or Nei Zheng Bu before the Communist Party came to power), and the maps clearly depict the vicinity of Lanak La as being coterminous with India, unlike Zhou En Lai’s claim line that truncated India much earlier at the Kongka Pass. Even previously published Chinese maps such as A New Atlas of China ( Chung hua min kuo hsin titu, published in 1934), contained the “New Map of the Republic of China” on the occasion of the 60th Anniversary of Shenpao (Shanghai News), that showed India in the vicinity of the Lanak La pass (running much further eastwards than current Chinese maps show)." p. 592: Figure 1.
Kongka Pass incident
In October 1959, an Indian police party was sent to set up posts in three locations — Tsogtsalu, Hot Springs and Shamal Lungpa — which were in undisputed Indian territory per the recent Chinese maps. The party was led by an Intelligence Bureau officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent, Karam Singh, who was an experienced patroller in Ladakh. As late as June 1958, Singh had led patrols to Lanak La without incidents. Singh states that they had established a post at Hot Springs and were about to head to Shamal Lungpa when, on 20 October, two men sent out for reconnaissance went missing.
Larry Wortzel (2025). 9781428916517, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. . ISBN 9781428916517 Later information reveals that the location was on the bank of the Chang Chenmo River, somewhere between the mouth of Silung Barma and that of Silung Kongma.
It appears that Tyagi's men were informed of the firefight by one of Singh's constables but they were under simultaneous attack and failed to be of any help; however, his team incurred no fatalities despite injuries on several men. On 22 October, Tyagi retreated to Tsogtsalu and four severely injured men were evacuated by air.
Chinese People's Liberation Army Historical Data Series Editorial Board (1997). 9787506533485, Beijing:解放军出版社. ISBN 9787506533485
(2025). 9787100032544, Beijing:商印书. ISBN 9787100032544
Military posts and infrastructure
The Indian border post is located to the west of Kongka Pass at Hot Springs. A war-memorial is situated at the place.
Konghong Highway (China, S519) and Kongka Shankou Highway mapped on OpenStreetMap, retrieved 22 October 2020.
In addition to these, a Tiankong Highway (天空线) or Tianwendian–Kongka Highway, appears to have been constructed between 2013 and 2020. It passes through territory marked as being on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control by the US Office of the Geographer in 2013. Detailed World Polygons (LSIB), Asia and Russia, 2013, EarthWorks, Stanford University It is a mountain road that runs till the Tianwendian post in the Depsang Plains. It runs parallel to the Line of Actual Control and passes through Nischu and Heweitan. It also connects to the Wenjia Road (), which leads to the Galwan Valley. Tiankong Xian and Wen Jia Road mapped on OpenStreetMap, retrieved 22 October 2020.
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